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WEST YI.GINIA LAW QUArTErLY
have power to require its citizens to work regardless of an emerg-
ency. The practical difficulties of enforcing laws to that effect
would be great, which has likely restrained the states from fre-
quent exercise of that power. But as far as the power alone is
concerned it resides in the states as a necessary incident to their
self preservation.
Another objection to the Council of Defense acts is that they
cannot be justified under 'war power' as the grant of that power
to the Federal Government deprives the states of its exercise. All
writers agree that one of the concomitants of citizenship is the
duty owed by each citizen to the state in time of peril of defend-
ing that state. Because the power to declare war and to raise and
nm.intain armies was granted to the Federal Government does it
not follow that the states thereby rendered themselves impotent
to aid the nation in the prosecution of war ?1o It would seem that
the grant of such power carries with it the implication that the
states must aid in carrying it out when necessary for the preserva-
tion of the Federal Government of which they are each a part.
As there is a duty of each citizen to -defend the state, there is a
duty of the individual states to defend the nation, so there must
be power in the states over the citizens, otherwise there could be
no duty.
It is submitted that the Council of Defense acts do not violate
the 13th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, that whether
the power required to enforce same is war power, emergency
power, or some other power, it must exist for the preservation of
the states, and that it is the province of the legislatures rather
than of the courts to determine when its exercise is necessary for
the common good.
-Clifford Snider.*
JURISDICTION TO AWARD THE CUSTODY OF A CHILD AFTER DIVORCE.
-Two theories as to the basis of jurisdiction to award custody of
a child are advanced. One is that the court of the sovereign of
the child's domicile shall pass upon the question.' The other is
20 "Unless the power of the several states to enact legislation beneficial to the
federal government while it is at war with a foreign country is lexpressly prohibited
by the constitution or such prohibition is a necessary implication from other powers
granted to the federal government or denied to the states, the several states have
such power." Per Curiam, State v. McClure, 105 AtL. 712 (Del. 1919).
* Member of the Clarksburg, W. Va., Bar.
Nugent v. Vetzera, L. R. 2 Eq. 704 (1866) ; Wells v. Andrews. 60 Miss. 373
(1882) ; Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195 (1862) ; Hammond v. Hammond, 90 Ga. 527,
16 S. E. 265 (1892) ;Daily v. Schrader, 34 Ind. 260 (1870) ; Wilson v. Elliott, 96
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that the court of the sovereign of the territory where the child is
found shall determine the child's status. 2  If both of these doc-
trines stand, obvious difficulties may arise. If the same person be
appointed guardian at the child's domicile and also where the child
is found he will be subject to two masters. If they issue con-
flicting orders which will he obey? If the only true doctrine is
that the court of the place where the child is has the control over his
status as a ward, then every change. of residence will involve, po-
tentially at least, the appointment of a new custodian, subject to
the control of a different court. Since one very important element
in the status of guardianship is permanence and continuity, such a
theory is open to serious criticism.3 If, on the other hand, the court
of the child's domicile alone is able to appoint validly a custodian of
the child's person, there are still objections to be answered. There
is the practical difficulty of being compelled to travel to the state
Ter- 472, 73 S. W. 946 (1903); Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310, 99 S. W. 542
(1907) ; Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987 (1914) ; Townsend v. Kendall,
4 Minn. 412 (1860) ; Clarke v. Lyon, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N. W. 472 (1908) ; State
ex rel. Hahn v. King, 109 La. 161, 33 So. 121 (1902) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Sage
v. Sage, 160 Pa. 399, 28 Atl. 863 (1894). See Warren v. Hofer, 13 Ind. 167, 169
(1859). See I BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, pt. 1, §148.
There are several cases where the court awarded custody to the domiciliary guardian,
not because of any absolute right in him, but because it was for the welfare of the
children. People ex tel. Allen v. Allen, 105 N. Y. 628. 11 N. E. 143 (1887) ; Re
Davis, 25 Out. Rep. 579; Re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E. 126 (1911) ; Grimes
v. Butch, 142 Ind. 113, 41 N. E. 328 (1895).
In Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81 S. E. 706 (1914), the father and child
were present in West Virginia when a decree of divorce and an order granting cus-
tody of the child to the mother were given in Indiana. It was not clear where th'e
father's domicile was at the time, but apparently it was in Indiana. The West Vir-
ginia court held the Indiana decree binding.
There is authority that the court which has awarded custody validly to one person
retains Jurisdiction to modify its decree later even though that person has since re-
moved from the jurisdiction with the child and obtained a domicile elsewhere. State
ex rel. Nipp v. District Court, 46 Mont. 425, 128 Pac. 590 (1912) ; Morrill V. Morrill,
83 Conn. 479, 77 At. 1 (1910) ; Stetson -v. Stetson, 80 Me. 483, 15 At]. 60 (1888).
In the last two cases, though the court originally awarding custody apparently was
not the court of the domicile, yet the basis of the decision would apply with equal
or greater force where it was the domiciliary court that had made the original award.
2 Johnstone -v. Beattie, 10 Cl. & F. 42 (1843) ; Seeley -v. Seeley, 30 App. D. C.
191. 12 Ann. Cas. 1058 (1907) ; People ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 86 11. App. 20
(1899) ; Re Bort, 25 Kan. 309 (1881) ; Jones v. Bowman. 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439
(190) ; Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 Atil. 679 (1897) ; Ex parte Boyd, 157
S. W. 254 (Tex. 1913) ; Wilkin's Guardian, 146 Pa. 585, 23 Atl. 325 (1892) ; Kenner
v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S. W. 779 (1918) ; Mylius v. Cargill, 142 Pac. 918
(N. M. 1914). Of. Hanrahan v. Sears, 72 N. H. 71, 54 AtI. 702 (1902). See STORY,
CONFLICT or LAWS, 7 ed., § 539.
The result in Kenner v. Kenner, supra, and Mylius v. Cargill, supra, may be
supported on the ground that the courts then deciding the question in those cases were
courts of the domicile of the child at the time they rendered their decisions.
The absence of the child from the state has been held to defeat Jurisdirtion of a
court to award custody even though the domicile of the father (and hence that of the
child) was within the jurisdiction. Kline v. Kline, 57 Ia. 386, 10 N. W. 825 (1881);
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kan.,483, 43 Pac. 779 (1896).
A court of a state in which the child is neither domiciled nor present cannot de-
cree custody. Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587, 20 S. E. 1W (1894).
The reasoning of some courts would indicate they thought the fact that a decree
awarding custody may be modified from time to time gave any court jurisdiction to'
modify it. Clearly this is erroneous. The fundamental question still remains as to
what sovereign's courts do have jurisdiction to modify the decree.
3 See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, pt. I, § 148.
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of the child's domicile in order to have any change of guardian-
ship made, or to prevent a change being made.4 Again, if this is
the sole test of jurisdiction to appoint or remove custodians of the
person, it would seem to follow that the sovereign of the state
where the child is would be powerless to protect him. Such -a
proposition is opposed to fundamental principles as to the nature
of a sovereign's jurisdiction."
Instead of saying that either or both of these doctrines are abso-
lute, however, it is common to attempt to reconcile them. The com-
promise generally urged is that, although the state where the child
is does have power to award custody, in comity it will give great
weight to the domiciliary appointment.8 To those who seek a prin.
ciple of law to determine conflicts of this sort between rival juris-
dictions, and who are unwilling that their settlement should rest
upon the ever uncertain comity between states, such a solution is
unsatisfactory.
There is another possible theory which is well stated in the fol-
lowing quotation: "If a Turkish or Hindoo husband were trav-
elling in this country with his wife, or temporarily resident here,
we should, without hesitation, acknowledge the relation of husband
and wife between them; but the legal pre-eminence of the husband
as to acts done here would be admitted only to the extent that the
marital rights are recognized by our laws, and not as they are rec-
ognized by the law of his domicile. If a Roman father, or a
father from any country which had adopted the Roman law of
paternal power, were travelling in this country with a minor child,
we should acknowledge the relation of parent and child, but we
should admit, I presume, as a general rule, the exercise of the pa-
ternal power no further than as it is authorized by our own law.' T
So, too, the validity of the static right of slavery depends upon the
law of the slave's domicile, though the protection to be afforded
that right depends upon the jurisdiction where the slave is.8
4 In a Pennsylvania case the court held that though the law of the domicile of the
child should control, yet the courts of Pennsylvania were quite competent to apply
that law, Sage v. Sage, 160 Pa. 399, 28 Atil. 863 (1894). sed quaere: Is this a
question of what law shall apply or of what sovereign's court has Jurisdiction? It
is believed It is the latter.
Woodworth v. spring, 86 Mass. 321 (1862) ; Hartman v. Henry, 217 S. W. 987
(M%1o. 1920). See Beale, "Progress of the Law: Conflict of Laws," 34 HARv. L.
Ptv. 58.
6 "But notwithstanding that a foreign guardian has n- absolute rights as such in
a foreign jurisdiction, the fact that he is such is entitled to great weight in the
courts of another State, when called upon to determine, in their discretion, to whose
custody a minor child shall be committed." STORY. CONFLICT OF LAWS, 7 ed., § 499.
See Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452, 470 (1884) ; Woodworth v. Spring, supra. See
also, MINOR, CONFLICT Or LAwS, § 115.
7 Polydore v. Prince, Ware 402, 405 (U. S. 1837)
8 Polydore v. Prince, supra.
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It is submitted that the principle just stated is the one which
should determine the jurisdiction to award custody of a child after
the divorce of its parents. The court of the domicile alone should
have the right to create the static right by appointing a custodian.
When, later, the child is in another state that state has full power
to determine what incidents it will give to the relationship so long
as the child is within its boundaries.9 For the welfare of the child
it may appoint another person as guardian for so long as it re-
mains within that jurisdiction.'0 It has been held that, where the
welfare of the child demands it, it may refuse to allow the domi-
ciliary custodian to take the child back to the state of the dom-
icile.11  Such a rule would seem to be doubtful, at least if the dom-
iciliary guardian were not shown to be entirely unfit. 2 In a lead-
ing English case' 3 an Austrian domiciliary guardian's right to take
the child out of England was recognized even though an English
guardian had been appointed and it was clearly for the best inter-
ests of the child to remain in England.
So long as he is living, or until another person has been properly
appointed to displace him, the father is recognized as the natural
guardian of his child.'" Since this is so, is it necessary for the
court of the domicile of the child (assuming it is the proper eourt
to award the custody of the child) to have jurisdiction over the
father as well as the child? It has been so held.'5 If this is cor-
rect, it would follow that after a guardian has been appointed in
place of the father, that the status thus created cannot be af-
fected by any court except one which, in addition to being the
court of the child's domicile, has personal jurisdiction over the
Woodworth v. Spring, supra. See Beale, "Progress of the Law: Conflict of
Laws," supra.
10 Nugent v. Vetzera, supra- "Every nation has an exclusive right to regulate
persons and property within its jurisdiction according to its own laws, and the prin-
ciples of public policy on which its own government Is founded." Woodworth V.
Spring, supra, 32. See Beale, "Progress of the Law: Conflict of Laws," supra
"The legal situs of the ward being his domicile, the guardian appointed there is
regarded as having peculiar powers with respect to the ward's person. Although the
status is not a permanent one, and other guardians, upon occasion, may be appointed
in other states where the ward may have his actual situs . . . yet the authority of
such a guardian is always local only. He has no general authority over the ward's
person which will be recognized in other states." MiNoR, CONFLiCT OF LAWS, § 115.
n Johnstone v. Beattie, supra; Re Bort, supra; Jones v. Bowman, supra; Ex
Varte Boyd, supra; Kelsey v. Green, supra. See Hanrahan v. Sears, supra.
12 Pinney v. Sulzen, supra; Hammond v. Hammond, supra. See Beale, "Progress
of the Law: Conflict of Laws-," supra, 59.
2 Nugent v. Vetzera, supra.
24 See MxINOn, CoNFICT OF LAWS, § 37.
25 De la Alontanya v. De la Mlontanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896). Con-
versely, If both parents have been properly served and the child Is present, even
though domiciled elsewhere, the court may decree custody. State v. Rhoades, 29
Wash. 61, 69, Pac. 389 (1902) ; Re Vetterlein's Petition, 4 R. I. 378 (1884). Contra,
Lanning v. Gregory, supra.
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new guardian."8 Though it is not safe to argue from controverted
theories of jurisdiction to grant divorce, it may be pointed out
that the relation of guardian and ward is a double one just as is
that of husband and wife. It is not within the scope of this note
to inquire into the question whether a divorce decree is a decree
in rem operating upon the marriage status as the res;" or whether
it is a decree in personam, requiring jurisdiction of both parties
to be valid.18 It may be suggested, however, that whatever is the
sound theory as to jurisdiction for divorce is the sound theory as to
jurisdiction to award custody of a child after divorce. If per-
sonal jurisdiction of both parties is necessary to grant a divorce,
personal jurisdiction of the father (or of the appointed guardian)
must exist in order that there'may be jurisdiction to affect the
static right to custody of a child. If, however, the court of the
domicile can act upon the marriage status as a res, without per-
sonal jurisdiction of both parties, the same principle would apply
to the status of guardianship.
The case of Griffin v. Griffin "'9 has raised recently the problems
here under discussion. A court of California where all the par-
ties were domiciled awarded custody of the children, after a di-
vorce decree, to the mother, with the restriction that she should not
take them out of the jurisdiction without permission. She obtain-
ed permission to take them to Oregon, but on condition that she
bring them back. She did not do so. The father brought an ac-
tion in the California court to have the first order altered, serving
the mother in Oregon by publication. This service was insuffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction. The California court, however, then
modified its original order and gave custody to the father, who
brought habeas corpus in Oregon to obtain the children. The Ore-
gon court denied the petition on three grounds: 1. The welfare
of the children who were in Oregon would be served best by hav-
ing them remain with the mother, although the father was not
shown to be unfit. 2. The service on the mother was ineffective
'i Note the doctrine that the court which appoints a custodian of the person of a
child retains personal jurisdiction over the custodian to modify the decree even though
he has departed from the jurisdiction with the child and established a new domicile
elsewhere. See cases cited in note 1, supra.
17 See MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 92: WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3 ed.,
§ 237a.
is See MLNOR, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 93; WHATON, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3 ed.,
§ 237a.
The cases holding that mere presence of the child pis personal jurisdiction of both
parents will give a court jurisdiction to award custody would Indicate that the courts
were there applying the in personam theory of jurisdiction. Note 15, supra.
19 187 Pac. 598 (Ore. 1920).
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and therefore the California court did not have jurisdiction of the
mother, who was then guardian of the children. 3. At the time
of the modification of the decree in California the mother had ac-
quired a domicile in Oregon; hence the domicile of the children
was with her in Oregon and the California court no longer had
any jurisdiction.
The correctness of the first two grounds of the decision has
been covered by the discussion above. Whether the third is sound
depends upon whether the domicile of the children followed that
of the mother.2" There is authority that an appointed guardian
cannot change the domicile of the child to another state from the
state in which he has been appointed. 21  Where the guardian ap-
pointed is also the natural guardian it seems that he may change
the ward's domicile. 22 It has been argued-that if the father, after
divorce, were awarded custody, he could change the child's domi-
cile because he is its natural guardian, but that if the mother were
awarded custody, after divorce, she is, like any appointed guardian,
limited to the one jurisdiction in her control over the child's dom-
icile.23  However, what little authority there is holds that the
mother may change the child's domicile in such a case.24 It is
believed that this is more in accord with present day ideas. If this
be so, the case clearly can be supported on the ground that Oregon,
because it was the jurisdiction of the children's domicile at the
-O "That the California court cannot by its order constrain an adult person, not a
Wrongdoer, to remain in the state, and cannot prevent his acquiring a new domicil
for himself is certain. Beale "Progress of the Law: Conflict of Laws," supra 59.
21 See MINOR, CONFLICT or LAWS, 88.
="Should the question ever arise, it will possibly be held that a guardian cannot
change the domicile of his ward, and almost certainly that he cannot do this unless
the ward's residence is, as a matter of fact that of the guardian." DICEY, CONFLICT
or LAWS, 2 ed., 129. See MINon, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 88; 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF
LAws, 3 ed. § 42a. See also 24 HAav. L. REV. 144. The law, however, is not
definitely settled. Distinctions between testamentary guardians and those appointed
by courts have been suggested but have not found favor. See MINOR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 89. "It is clear that a guardian appointed in a state in which the ward is
not domiciled, but is temporarily residing, cannot change the latte's permanent
domicll." 1 WHARTON, COIFLICT OF LAWS, 3 ed., 102.
Where the ward is a member of the guardian's family and actually removes with
him there is authority to uphold the intimation by Dicey, supra, that his domicile
will change with that of the guardian. White v. Howard, 52 Barb. 294 (N. Y. 1868) ;
Wheeler v. Hollis, 19 Tex. 522 (1857). Contra, Mears v. Sinclair, 1 W. Va. 185
(testamentary guardian).
2 24 HAaV. L. REV. 144.
24 Fox v. Hicks, 81 Mind.- 197, 83 N. W. 538 (1900). See MINOR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 81; 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3 ed., § 41a. See also Beale, "Progress
of the Law: Conflict of Laws," supra, 59.
In Wilson -v. Elliott, suprd, and People ez rel. Hickey v. Hickey, supra, (headnote),
the courts assumed that the mother could change the domicile of the children by
removing them to another state even though the children had been given into the
custody of the father by the domiciliary court. This seems to be going too far.
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time of the modified California decree, was the only one with
power to affect the status of the children.
25
-G. E. .
STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF NATURAL
GAS AND ELECTRICITY.-Mluch confusion still exists in the cases as
to what are the correct criteria of the extent of a state's power
to regulate interstate commerce.- Doubtless the problem is one
which, because of the vast diversity of interests involved, may not
be solved by fixed rules.2  At any rate as the cases undoubtedly
establish the fact that the states can, under some circumstances,
directly regulate interstate commerce,3 it seems certain that sooner
or later the courts must discard the commonly-asserted "doctrine-
that the state cannot under any guise impose direct burdens
upon interstate commerce." 4 Of course, it is generally laid down
along with the above-mentioned doctrine that
"As to those subjects which require a general system or-
uniformity of regulation the power of Congress is exclu-
sive. In other matters, admitting of diversity of treatment
according to the special requirements of local conditions, the
states may act Within their respective jurisdictions until Con-
gress sees fit to act."5
But considerable confusion has arisen in applying these criteriz
because, among other reasons, in working out the constitutionality
or unconstitutionality of a given state regulation, it is common to.
start with the tacit assumption that the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce is princt facie exclusive, thus render-
ing any state regulation of interstate commerce prima facie uncon-
stitutional. Such a method of approaching the problem, however,
seems misleading and conducive to erroneous conclusions. The
states had power to regulate interstate commerce before Congress
2 The case is supported by Professor Beale on this ground. See Beale, "Progress.
of the Law: Conflict of Laws," supra, 59.
1 U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art I, § 8: "The Congress shall have power. . .to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several tes, and with the
Indian tribes."
Cf. In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., 225 N. Y. 397, 122 N. E. 260 (1919): "No.
general formula can tell us in advance where the line is to be drawn."
a Some of the leading cases in point are discussed in this note and cited In
footnotes 14, 16, 18 and 23, infra.
4 See e. g., The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 400, 33. Slfp. Ct. Rep.
729 (1913), ver Mr. Justice Hughes.
5 Ibid., 399. This form of statement has been commonly followed since the lead-
Ing case of Cooley ,. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851). See one or
the latest statements of these criteria in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service
Commission, U. S. Adv. Ops. 1919-20, 306.
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